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Abstract
In a paper of August 2013, I discussed the so-called SuperSpreader (SS)
epidemic model and emphasized that it has dynamics differing greatly from
the more-familiar uniform (or Poisson) textbook model. In that paper, SARS
in 2003 was the representative SS instance and it was suggested that MERS
may be another. In April of 2014, MERS incident cases showed a spectacular
spike (going from a handful in the previous April to more than 260 in that
month of 2014) reminiscent of a figure I published nine months previously.
Here I refit the two-level and several variant SS models to incident data
from January 1, 2013–April 30, 2014 and conclude that MERS will cause
a pandemic (all other factors remaining the same). In addition I discuss a
number of model-realism and fitting-methodology issues relevant to analysing
SS epidemics.
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Text
As in the previous paper, [1], I avoid the standard journal format (Intro-
duction/Methods/Results/Discussion) for ease of exposition. There are no
mathematical prerequisites for reading this paper.
To begin, look at Figure 1, adapted from the European Center for Dis-
ease Control (ECDC) website on May 5, 2014, showing incident cases of the
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS, also abbreviated MERS-CoV
because it is caused by a novel coronavirus). The ECDC explained that
the gigantic increase in cases, more than 10-fold, in April of 2014 might be
explained by:
• More sensitive case detection through more accurate case finding and
contact tracing . . .
• Increased zoonotic transmission . . .
• Breakdown in infection control measures . . . in the local health care
setting . . .
• Change in the virus resulting in more effective human-to-human trans-
mission . . .
• False positive lab results.
Concerning the fourth listed, a nearly simultaneous report by virologists
sequencing the virus found no suspicious mutations. While all of these ex-
planations are possible, the ECDC left out one: chance.
For instance, there is Figure 2, which I published 9 months before, showing
simulated cases (in hospital) for an SS epidemic with R0 slightly higher than
one. Why the strange delay and then the sudden spike? As explained in
that paper, an SS epidemic is stochastic and may have a long “kindling
time” before it takes off. I emphasize that no model parameter was allowed
to change with time during this simulation; the surprising pattern is due
solely to chance events during the epidemic.
Now consider Table 1, reporting model fits for three classes of SS epidemic
models to the ECDC data during Jan. 2013–April 2014. Look first just at
the column reporting R0—the “basic reproductive number” of the infection,
or average number of secondary cases caused by one infected case during the
time while remaining infectious. I will explain the models and other entries
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Figure 1: MERS incident case data (per month), adapted from a ECDC
figure.
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Incident Cases vs. Time for the SS Epidemic
Figure 2: An SSe with large V0 but lower R0, and sporadic cases.
Stopping the SS Epidemic II: MERS Goes Pandemic 6
below. Next examine Figures 3–5 for the simulated epidemics, showing cases
per month as in Fig. 1 but for 2013–April 2014 only, for a certain “run” of
the model called the GOFS, explained below.
A model with R0 > 1 displays, eventually, exponential growth, so the
meaning is: pandemic.
Table 1. Results of fitting three SS models
to the ECDC MERS incidence data, 2013–April 2014
Model R0 Rl Rh sporadic time
∗ alpha GOFS∗∗
A 1.0 0.49 58.0 3.1 - 137.5
B 1.44 0.30 55.0 - - 45.7
C 1.44 0.30 - - 1.31 78.7
∗ average time between sporadic cases, days
∗∗ square-root of sum-of-squares of simulated
minus observed cases, per month
Now to describe the three models in the fitting exercise. Model A is the
two-level model of [1], with a “low spreader” (secondary cases with mean
Rl) and “high spreader” (ditto but mean Rh) appearing with probabilities
arranged so that the overall mean of reproduction is R0. For Model B I tried
to use what information is currently available that can distinguish primary
(sporadic, zoonotic exposure) cases from cases due to human contacts, in
order to allow for an (unexplained; seasonal or other) increase in the sporadic
case rate. So I accessed the FluTrackers website, MERS case (hospitalization)
list page, on May 8, 2014, and dropped all the entries that contained any of
the following annotations: foreign (meaning not Middle East); health-care
worker (HCW), contact of confirmed case, multiple co-morbidities (reasoning
that such a patient was more likely to have contracted MERS in hospital than
at a camel farm) or recently in hospital (within 10 days of hospitalization
for MERS). I then derived a sporadic-incidence rate, cases per month, see
Fig. 6, and modified the model by adding it as a time-dependent covariate.
Finally, for Model C I adopted a variable Rh with a power-law distribution,
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Figure 3: Simulated MERS incident cases (per month), from the GOFS run
of Model A.
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Figure 4: Simulated MERS incident cases (per month), from the GOFS run
of Model B.
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Figure 5: Simulated MERS incident cases (per month), from the GOFS run
of Model C.
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Figure 6: My stab at a time-dependent sporadic incidence rate, based on
annotations in FluTrackers’s case list.
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described below, and kept the time-dependent sporadic rates. The reason for
the coincidences in Table 1 (e.g., 1.44 and 0.30 appearing twice) just reflects
a limit on the number of models considered for practical reasons; I divided a
range (e.g., R0 in [0.6, 2.0]; Rl between 0.3 and either R0, if R0 < 1, or one; Rh
in [10, 60]; sporadic time in [1, 6]; alpha in [1.1, 10]) into 8-10 parts and tested
all the parameter combinations. Fixed parameters were: mean noninfectious
period, 5.36 days; infectious period, 3.83 days (taken from fitting a SARS
model to 2003 data, [4]) with standard deviations (log-normal distributed)
of twice the means.
Why choose a variable Rh for Model C? I thought my two-level model a bit
simplistic. Remember from the SARS story the Metropole Hotel, the Prince
of Wales Hospital, the Amoy Gardens and that plane to Beijing (see, e.g., [4]
Chapter 6, for references). Perhaps Rh, instead of a fixed value, should have
some long-tailed distribution. So I programmed an alternative model with a
power law:
P [Rh > x ] =
(
1
xα
)
1 [x > 1 ] . (1)
This rather extreme choice has the pecularity that, for 1 < α < 2, Rh has
finite mean but infinite variance. This is not necessarily absurd (recall the
300+ secondary cases of one infected person at the Amoy Gardens apartment
complex in Hong Kong) as some finite upper bound would apply in any case.
A note on the fitting method. I use the famous “kNN” (k-th nearest
neighbor) method from computer science, which dates from the 1950s; it
is usually applied to pattern-recognition problems in which some samples
(of, say, pictures of cats, horses, or people) are available and the goal is to
classify a given sample (picture) into one of the categories. I reversed the idea
by taking the known samples to be simulations from my SS epidemic model
with various parameter combinations, with the sample to be classified coming
from nature. So the interpretation becomes: which simulation sample most
resembles the natural sample? The goodness-of-fit statistic (GOFS) I used is
the sum-of-squared-differences (or its square-root) in monthly incident cases
(more on that choice below) of the k-th nearest neighbor simulation sample
cases, minus the actual cases, with k = N4/9 (the optimal exponent as proven
in the book [4]) and usually N = 500 simulation samples. This methodology
is suitable for any kind of stochastic model and observed sample, as it makes
no assumptions whatsoever about distributions (e.g., no assumptions that
anything is normal) and reduces to maximum likelihood if you can simulate
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infinitely fast (i.e., as N → ∞). So there is no loss of efficiency if your
computer is speedy.
That being said, the method offers no advice on what to use for the GOFS
beyond the choice of k = N4/9. For instance, sum-of-squares of case-incidence
data may not be the most-informative choice given the main interest. For
the question: has MERS gone pandemic?, i.e., is R0 > 1?, obviously an epi-
demiological data set identifying secondary cases, tertiary cases, etc., would
be preferable, with the GOFS comparing frequencies of epidemiologically-
linked clusters of each size. In fact I used cluster data from the Lancet paper
of 2013, [2], in my 2013 paper (but a month later used incidence data as
well, with the same conclusion: not yet pandemic). At this time I have only
incidence and some informal descriptions of case status available, but I used
all the data known to me in the analysis reported here.
Two other issues are topics for further research. I ignored the handful
of cases from 2012, reasoning that case ascertainment early in an epidemic
caused by a novel organism was poor; the true starting time is unknown; and
that the model would try to fit all those zeros from 2012. The last raises
a curious question about prediction. Fitting the SS model to the first year-
and-a-half of data led to the conclusion of [1] that R0 < 1 then, but I now
find that the data was consistent with R0 greater than one. Can probabil-
ity statements, of the confidence-interval variety (“We are now 90 percent
confident that a pandemic is inevitable . . . ”), be derived for an SS epidemic,
and if so at what time point? Can similar confidence intervals be derived for
epidemic parameters? Consistent with the “everything through simulation”
philosophy for complex models with unknown statistical properties adver-
tised in [4], this can be studied, but at present this author’s PC required an
overnight run for a single analysis. More, or faster, computers are needed for
the task.
On May 14, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) IHR Emergency
Committee meeting concerning MERS-CoV declined to declare an interna-
tional health emergency, asserting that there is “no evidence of sustained
human-to-human transmission,” seemingly putting the blame on camels.
(They did state that “the seriousness of the situation had increased.”) In
my view, although evidence based on modeling is never as convincing as ev-
idence based on shoe-leather epidemiology and hard facts, the Committee
overlooked the stochastic nature of an SS epidemic, which can mean that
the lag of more than a year followed by a dramatic spike is consistent with
a pandemic, as opposed to some unexplained event (such as a wave of camel
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births or a breakdown of hospital infection-control procedures). Perhaps the
risk is in the eye of the beholder. Which is the more plausible explanation for
the 260+ case spike in April 2014: chance in an SS model, or some unusual
zoonotic or nosocomial happening? If the latter, we are betting on a one-off
event that will not be repeated. If the former, we must doubt the modeling
to accept the Committee’s statement; but which assumption am I supposed
to reject?
I conclude, on the basis of SS epidemic modeling and fitting, that MERS
threatens to go beyond, or is already beyond, the pandemic threshold. If
so, what happens next? A dip in cases in May, or even a longer period of
relative quietude stretching into the summer, should not be taken as grounds
for complacency (look again at Fig. 2). Paper [1] contains some results
about stopping the epidemic through secondary case isolation. (No drugs
or vaccines exist at present for human coronaviruses.) I can summarize by
saying that the SS epidemic is actually easier to control than a uniform
epidemic (as, e.g., influenza) because it offers a potential target for efficacious
intervention, namely if the superspreader is a consequence of context (patient
in an ICU, or symptomatic case on an airplane, as just occurred on a flight
to America originating in Saudi Arabia) as opposed to a biological factor
beyond our control. That is, up to a point—for I also showed that efficacy
diminshes with increasing V0, the variance of the basic reproduction number
(whose mean is R0). Nevertheless (and I admit considering a case here with
V0 = ∞) I regard it likely that the pandemic will, like SARS in 2003, be
rapidly controlled by public health agencies acting in concert with political
authorities, once the emergency is declared.
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Appendix 1: some model details
The incorporation of variable sporadic-case rates required some changes in
the implementation. The basic simulation routine is agent-based, meaning it
stores all times-to-events for all “agents” (cases), finds the next one, updates
the time, performs any changes, and stores new times-to-events as required.
What about reaching the end of the month? That becomes one of the stored
times-to-events; if that is the next leap forward, the time-to-next-sporadic-
case is replaced by another exponential random variable using the rate for
that month. But what if the rate hasn’t changed; do we make a mistake?
No. Recall the so-called “bus-waiting paradox,” which isn’t really a para-
dox but a property of the Poisson process (which is reasonable for sporadic
events) in which the time to the next occurrence always has an exponential
distribution. The point is that the Poisson process is memoryless, so the fact
that something (a new sporadic case) didn’t happen is forgettable.
The power law is easily introduced by the trick:
Rh = U
−1/α, (2)
where U is a uniform [0, 1] random variable supplied by the RNG. Then an
infection intensity is chosen as: [infectious period]/Rh, and used to create a
secondary case after an exponential waiting time: (− log(U)/intensity), as
usual. The fact that Rh has infinite variance if 1 < α < 2 causes no trouble.
Note that the search region in Model C is restricted by
α <
R0
R0 − 1 , (3)
which is necessary to assure that Rh = α/(α− 1) > R0.
C code, which should run on anything, is available from the author.
